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Transylvanian Saxon Politics, Hungarian State Building and the Case of the 
Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein (1881-2)* 
 
On 16 April 1882, at a meeting in Hermannstadt, an important predominantly 
German-speaking provincial town in the far South-Eastern corner of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, the following resolution was agreed upon by the Transylvanian 
Saxon participants: 
We defend ourselves against any thoughts concerning our loyalty to the State and 
deny with indignation any attempt to represent ourselves and the Saxons in 
Transylvania as enemies of the Hungarian state … we are citizens of Hungary and 
want to remain German ...1 
 
The meeting was part of a Hungary-wide series of demonstrations both for and against 
the acceptance of aid from the recently formed Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein 
(ADS) based in Berlin.2 One month later, amidst similar demonstrations in the village 
Heltau located five miles south-west of Hermannstadt, the sentiments were similar.3 After 
agreeing to accept aid from ADS, one of the prominent speakers, Dr. Ziegler, reiterated 
that the Transylvanian Saxons were not against the Hungarian state. He continued: ‘And, 
nevertheless, we are enemies of the State; - because – because we are German and want 
to remain German’.4 
This article will look at the Transylvanian Saxon dilemma – in essence, the desire 
                                                 
*I would like to thank the Europa Institut Budapest for hosting a lengthy research stay. 
1 Die Deutschen in Ungarn und Siebenbürgen und der ‘Deutsche Schulverein’ (Hermannstadt, 1882), p. 90. 
Place names are a contentious issue in Central and Eastern Europe scholarship. In this article for readability 
the place name in the text will generally be the German version, while the other variants will be referenced 
in the footnotes eg. Hermannstadt/Nagyszeben/Sibiu. Some place names normally not given in German will 
be in Hungarian or Romanian for the text with variants in the footnotes.  For towns and cities with a 
commonly used English place name, then English will be used. 
2 The name of the organisation varies between Deutsche Schulverein and Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Schulverein depending on the document. 
3 Heltau/Nagydisznód/Cisnădie. 
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to remain linguistically and ethnically German while living as loyal citizens of a Magyar 
dominated Hungary – in light of a specific series of events and from two perspectives.  
Immediately upon its foundation in 1881, the ADS offered funds to German communities 
in Hungary for specific German-language educational and cultural purposes, thus 
prompting a wave of publicity, diplomatic exchanges, comments in parliament and town 
meetings.5 A snapshot of these few months shows the complex and fluid political 
landscape the Saxons had to negotiate as well as the considerable divisions within the 
Saxon community – both in political tactics and in local specificities. To delve into 
Transylvanian Saxon experiences of a rapidly modernizing and nationalizing Hungary 
requires recognition of their variety and vulnerability. Particularly important during the 
ADS incident was the potential involvement of a newly formed and powerful Imperial 
Germany in Transylvanian Saxon and, therefore, Hungarian affairs. German involvement 
could take a number of forms. This could involve direct aid from private organisations 
like the ADS, or attempts to influence official German government policy, or a general 
call to European public opinion. All were tried at varying times by concerned individuals 
in Germany, though with little success. During the 1870s there was minimal German 
interest in the Saxons with only a few isolated publications promoting support for the 
Transylvanian Saxons. By contrast, this trickle became a veritable flood after the 
foundation of the ADS in 1881.  
This article therefore has a dual focus: first, on the Transylvanian Saxon press 
and, second, on the various pamphlets circulating in Imperial Germany. How did the 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Die Deutschen in Ungarn und Siebenbürgen und der ‘Deutsche Schulverein, p. 135. 
5 It has been referred to as ‘the pamphlet scandal of the Deutscher Schulverein’. See I. Senz, Die Nationale 
Bewegung der ungarländischen Deutschen vor dem Erstern Weltkrieg. Eine Entwicklung im Spannungsfeld 
zwischen Alldeutschtum und ungarischer Innenpolitik (Munich, 1977), p. 59.  
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Saxons act and react during the incident? Could they reconcile being members of the 
German-speaking Saxon community and loyal Hungarian citizens? What were the 
perceptions towards and interpretation of events as they unfolded? How interested was 
the Reich German public in the Saxons’ plight? What was the relationship between 
Imperial Germany and the Saxon political leaders? Finally, how were relations with 
Imperial Germany and the Hungarian government in Budapest affected? 
The historiography on late nineteenth century Transylvanian Saxon history has 
two main strands within which the events of 1881-2 can be interpreted. Traditionally, the 
ADS demonstrations have been portrayed as part of the gradual Transylvanian Saxon 
move towards a stronger German national consciousness. The powerful influence of 
Friedrich Teutsch, a Transylvanian Lutheran priest and historian, has been an important 
factor in the construction of this linear narrative. His interpretation, as outlined in his 
essay ‘The Development of Our National Consciousness’ (1895) was that: 
The Schulverein demonstrations in Hungary declared from thousands to 
thousands: [the Transylvanian Saxons] are German and want to remain German; 
loyalties to the Volk and to the state do not stand in opposition to each other.6 
 
In the 1920s, Teutsch, when completing the final volume of the monumental history of 
the Transylvanian Saxons which his father had begun seventy years earlier, described the 
Schulverein demonstrations as continuing to live in the collective memory.7 Another 
witness to the demonstrations, Edmund Steinacker, a descendant of Zipser Germans 
(German communities in modern-day Slovakia), placed the Schulverein events in the 
                                                 
6 F. Teutsch, ‘Die Entwicklung unseres nationalen Bewußtseins’ in id., ed., Bilder aus der vaterländischen 
Geschichte (Hermannstadt, 1895), p. 398.  A similar view is expressed, in almost the same words, in 
Friedrich Teutsch’s biography of his father. F. Teutsch., Georg Daniel Teutsch. Geschichte seines Lebens 
(Hermannstadt, 1909), pp. 301-302. 
7 F. Teutsch, Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen für das sächsische Volk, Vol. 4: 1868-1919 Unter dem 
Dualismus (Hermannstadt, 1926), p. 89. 
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same general trajectory, emphasising the nationalist movement’s vitality after the turn of 
the century when he was heavily involved.8 The corollary to this viewpoint is a portrayal 
of the Hungarian government as fundamentally intolerant and consumed with 
constructing a unitary Magyar nation-state. In this respect, Robert Seton-Watson’s work 
in the early twentieth century was particularly influential in its criticism of the Hungarian 
government’s policies.9 A number of subsequent works have followed in these footsteps 
emphasising, to differing degrees, a combination of developing Saxon-German national 
consciousness and overbearing Hungarian policies.10  
The second historiographical strand attempts to place Hungarian government 
policy – and thus also the Transylvanian Saxon dilemma – in the context of the immense 
social and economic changes associated with a rapidly modernising region. The 
Hungarian historians Ferenc Glatz and Peter Hanák have argued that the process of 
assimilation, so vital to Hungarian ambitions, was largely attributable to general factors 
of bourgeois transformation, demographic changes and economic development, though 
                                                 
8 E. Steinacker, Lebenserinnerungen (Munich, 1937), pp. 110-12 and 136-45. Other works published in the 
inter-war period and following this general schema are E. Barta and K. Bell, Geschichte der Schutzarbeit 
am deutschen Volkstum (Dresden, 1930), K. Bell, ed., Siebenbürgen (Das Deutschtum im Ausland) 
(Dresden, 1930), E. Weisenfeld, Die Geschichte der politischen Publizistik bei den Siebenbürger Sachsen 
(Limburg an der Lahn, 1938), F. Valjavec, ‘Das deutsche Bürgertum und die Anfänge der deutschen 
Bewegung in Ungarn’, Südostdeutsche Forschungen 3 (1938), pp. 376-94 and F. Valjavec, ‘Quellen zu den 
Anfängen der deutschen Bewegung in Ungarn’, Südostdeutsche Forschungen 4 (1939), pp. 465-508. For 
background to much of the work, in particular the institutional history and the continuties before, through 
and after the Nazi era see Mathias Beer and Gerhard Seewann, eds., Südostforschung im Schatten des 
Dritten Reiches. Institutionen – Inhalte – Personen (Munich, 2004). 
9 Most prominently in R.W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (1908). Similarly, from the same 
generation, Oscar Jászi talks of ‘[t]he [Hungarian] policy of an exaggerated unification and an artificial 
Magyarization’. O. Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929), p. 308. 
10 G. Schödl, ‘Am Rande des Reiches am Rande der Nation: Deutsche im Königreich Ungarn (1867-
1914/18)’ in id., ed., Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas: Land an der Donau (Berlin, 1995), pp. 350-
454; O. Folberth, ‘Die Auswirkung des “Ausgleichs” von 1867 auf Siebenbürgen’ in T. Mayer, ed., Der 
österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich von 1867. Seine Grundlagen und Auswirkungen (Munich, 1968), 48-
70 and G. Weidenfeller, VDA. Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland. Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein 
(1881-1918). Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Nationalismus und Imperialismus im Kaiserreich 
(Bern, 1976). 
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the government policy of Magyarization clearly contributed.11 More recently, Joachim 
Puttkamer has looked specifically at Saxon schooling and the Hungarian state in the 
context of an overall modernisation process – a suitably capacious term.12 In short, the 
Transylvanian Saxons and their relationship to the Hungarian state are placed within 
wider processes of modernisation which were unfolding throughout Europe at the time.  
Some recent works have been more aware of the divisions and changing tactics of 
the Saxon politicians, while retaining a general sense of nationalist teleology.13 In this 
article, I have attempted to describe the path of Saxon politics as strewn with turns, 
alternative routes, open-ended possibilities and wayward individuals. In parliament, for 
example, the Saxons were sometimes with the government, sometimes in opposition; 
sometimes in alliance with others, sometimes free; sometimes united, often divided. The 
Hungarian government, too, at various times relaxed its policy towards the Saxons. For 
example, in the late 1880s, the Saxons began negotiations with the Hungarian 
government for an understanding, which eventually led to the Second Saxon Day on 17 
June 1890 and entry into the government coalition.14 In the late nineteenth century 
                                                 
11 See, for example, F. Glatz, ‘Bourgeois Transformation, Assimilation, and Nationalism’ in id., ed., 
Hungarians and their Neighbours in Modern Times, 1867-1950 (New York, 1996), pp. 33-43; P. Hanák, 
‘Problems of Jewish Assimilation in Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’ in P. 
Thane, G. Crossick and R. Floud, eds., The Power of the Past. Essays for Eric Hobsbawm (Cambridge, 
1984), pp. 235-50 and P. Hanák, ‘Verbürgerlichung und Assimilation in Ungarn im 19. Jahrhundert’ in 
Péter Hanák, Ungarn in der Donau-Monarchie. Probleme der bürgerlichen Umgestaltung eines 
Vielvölkerstaates (Vienna, 1984), pp. 281-319.  
12 J. Puttkamer, Schulalltag und nationale Integration in Ungarn. Slowaken, Rumänen und Siebenbürger 
Sachsen in der Auseinandersetzung mit der ungarischen Staatsidee, 1867-1914 (Munich, 2003), pp. 15-30. 
See also id., ‘Kein europäischer Sonderfall. Ungarns Nationalitätenproblem im 19. Jahrhundert und der 
jüngere Nationalismus’ in M. Fata, ed., Das Ungarnbild der deutschen Historiographie (Stuttgart, 2004), 
pp. 84-98. 
13 C. Göllner, ed., Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in den Jahren 1848-1918 (Cologne and Vienna, 1988), pp. 
108-205 and F. Gottas, ‘Die Deutschen in Ungarn’ in A. Wandruszka and P. Urbanitsch, eds., Die 
Habsburger Monarchie Vol. 3. Die Völker des Reiches  (2 vols., Vienna, 1980), 2, pp. 340-410. 
14 A short overview with some original sources is provided in G. Egry, ‘Ein anderer Ausgleich. Einiges zur 
Vorgeschichte des Sachsentages 1890’, Zeitschrift für siebenbürgische Landeskunde 29 (2006) 1, pp. 51-
61. See also Göllner, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in den Jahren 1848-1918, pp. 184-97. 
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modernisation and Magyarization were facts of life for the Saxon community but they did 
not necessarily have to go hand-in-hand. In a recent book Rogers Brubaker has asserted 
that ‘… the political costs of harsh nationalizing policies outweighed the ethnolinguistic 
gains. National movements that might have been won over to the Hungarian state turned 
irreconcilably against it’.15 Nationalist state building was not the only path towards 
modernization.16 Yet both implicitly assume a teleology – whether towards a nation-state 
or a certain view of modern society. Throughout this article, I have attempted to counter 
this tendency and tried to contextualise the Schulverein events within the various 
contingencies, complexities and contradictions of Saxon, Transylvanian, Hungarian, 
Austrian and German politics of the time. 
 
    *** 
 In her book entitled ‘The Land Beyond the Forest’, published in 1888, Emily 
                                                 
15 R. Brubaker, M. Feischmidt, J. Fox and L. Grancea, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a 
Transylvanian Town (Princeton, 2006), p. 43. The development of Transylvanian bourgeois society in 
general followed ethnic lines. See the discussion in G. Gyáni, ‘Middle Class and Bürgertum in Hungary 
with Special Regard to Transylvania during the Period of Dualism’ in H. Löwe, G. Trontsch and S. 
Troebst, eds., Minderheiten, Regionalbewußtsein und Zentralismus in Ostmitteleuropa (Cologne-Weimar-
Vienna, 2000), pp. 185-94. It is an open question whether this necessarily had to be the case and whether a 
supra-national Bildungsbürgertum was a possibility. See the interesting comments in B. Szelényi, 
‘Enlightenment from Below: German-Hungarian Patriots in Eighteenth-Century Hungary’, Austrian 
History Yearbook 34 (2003), pp. 111-43 and Z. Török, ‘The Friend of Progress: Learned Societies and the 
Public Sphere in the Transylvanian Reform Era’, Austrian History Yearbook 36 (2005), pp. 94-120. 
16 Pieter Judson has also pleaded for the decoupling of modernization and nationalism. P. Judson, 
Guardians of the Nation. Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass., 
2006), pp. 7-8. Judson’s work is part of a wave of recent works on Central and Eastern European 
nationalism which question the extent of ethnic identification and nationalist politics. In particular the term 
‘national indifference’ has become frequently used. See Judson, Guardians of the Nation, pp. 1-11 and T. 
Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-
1948 (Ithaca, 2008),  pp. 1-12. In relation to Transylvania there are interesting discussions in Brubaker, 
Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, pp. 4-13 and 63-7. In a related 
argument, Puttkamer questions the actual enforcement of the Magyarization, arguing that in everyday life 
the effects were often not as harsh as represented. J. Puttkamer, ‘Nationale Peripherien. Strukturen und 
Deutungsmuster im ungarischen Schulwesen 1867-1914’ in E. Hárs, W. Müller-Funk, U. Reber and C. 
Ruthner, eds., Zentren, Peripherien und kollektive Identitäten in Österreich-Ungarn (Tübingen and Basel, 
2006), pp. 97-110 and Puttkamer, Ungarische Schulpolitik und deutscher Schulalltag, pp. 32-57.   
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Gerard wrote of the Transylvanian Saxons that: 
… it is a marvel how this little handful of Germans, brought into a strange country 
and surrounded by enemies on all sides, should have maintained their 
independence and preserved their identity under such a combination of adverse 
circumstances.17 
 
Constituting approximately 10% of Transylvania’s population (Romanians were 55% and 
Hungarians 33%18) the Transylvanian Saxons had preserved their sense of community 
through extensive local autonomy and their strong Lutheran faith. Yet there were also 
considerable divisions within this community – between towns and regions, ideological 
viewpoints, generations, political tactics and strong personalities.19 In the mid to late 
nineteenth century, Transylvanian Saxon politics was often perched between a general 
desire for unity and the realities of deep difference and disagreement. 
One major issue was traditional Saxon administrative and political autonomy, 
which, at differing times, had come under threat from both Vienna and Budapest. Saxon 
autonomy had a long history and had evolved over the centuries since their settlement at 
the request of the Hungarian King in the 12th century. In general, it consisted of an 
independent legal system, Royal Free town status for the important towns, administrative 
autonomy (including the election of their own officials), representation in the 
Transylvanian Diet and official acceptance of Lutheranism. The symbol of Saxon 
                                                 
17 E. Gerard, The Land Beyond the Forest. Facts, Figures and Fancies from Transylvania (New York, 
1888),  p. 10. Another traveller, Charles Boner, also expressed admiration for the continued existence of the 
Saxon community. C. Boner, Transylvania; its Products and its People (1865), pp. 69-73 and 374-84. 
18 These figures are for the historic principality Transylvania and are based on the census figures of 1880, 
1900 and 1910 as presented in Z. Szász, ed., History of Transylvania, Vol. 3 (Boulder, 2002), pp. 555 and 
560. The definition in the census depended on mother tongue. 
19 For good short introductions and overviews of Transylvanian Saxon history see Szász, History of 
Transylvania, Vol. 3; H. Roth, Kleine Geschichte Siebenbürgens (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna, 2003); R.J.W. 
Evans, ‘Transylvanian Saxons: A German Diaspora’ in R.J.W. Evans, Austria, Hungary, and the 
Habsburgs. Central Europe c. 1683-1867 (Oxford, 2006), pp. 209-27; K. Gündisch, Siebenbürgen und die 
Siebenbürger Sachsen (Munich, 1998) and E. Wagner, Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen. Ein 
Überblick (Thaur bei Innsbruck, 1990). 
8 
 
[Type text] 
 
autonomy was the Universitas Saxonum, normally traced to Matthias Corvinus’s royal 
grant of 1486. While its jurisdiction and structure changed considerably over time, by the 
mid-nineteenth century there was an elected Saxon Count, seven elected seats and the 
area it administered formed a unified legal, administrative and political whole.20  In 
addition, from 1437 the Saxons were one of the privileged estates within the 
Transylvanian Diet – along with the Hungarian nobles and the Hungarian-speaking 
Székely border guards – while the Romanian population were unrepresented.  
In more recent times Saxon autonomy and privileges were increasingly subject to 
parallel, competing pressures of centralisation from Vienna and Budapest. Centralisation 
from Vienna had a long heritage. It had begun with the reassertion of Habsburg rule in 
the early 18th century, was pursued with vigour but little success by Joseph II in the 1780s 
and continued into the nineteenth century – first, in the Metternich years and then, more 
rigorously, in the neo-absolutist era of the 1850s. In general the privileges and institutions 
of Saxon autonomy had withstood bureaucratic and religious pressures from the Imperial 
centre and had often reasserted legitimacy after periodic bouts of standardisation and 
administrative reform. Despite the dynasty’s Catholicism and Vienna’s attempts to 
centralise administration, the Saxons often expressed their loyalty to the Monarch and 
appealed directly for royal favour and protection.  
The drive for political control from Budapest was a more recent phenomenon and 
stemmed from the desire for a modern, greater Hungarian nation-state, including 
Transylvania. In medieval times Transylvania had been subservient to the King of 
Hungary but, during the Turkish occupation in the 16th and 17th centuries, had flourished 
                                                 
20 The seven towns were Hermannstadt, Kronstadt/Braşov/Brassó, Mediasch/ Mediaş/Medgyes, Schäßburg/ 
Sigishoara/ Segesvár, Bistritz/Bristriţa/Beszterce, Mühlbach/Sebeş/ Szászsebes and 
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as an independent Principality. After the Habsburg conquests of the late 17th century, 
Transylvania continued to be treated as a separate administrative province within the 
Habsburg Monarchy, while nominally remaining part of the traditional Kingdom of 
Hungary. Following the revival of Magyar culture and political dominance in the 
Hungarian Reform Era (1825 to 1848), the idea of an integrated Hungarian nation-state 
was increasingly mooted by Hungarian elites. Amidst the tumultuous events of 1848 – 
including a Hungarian government in Budapest with control over the national budget, 
troops and foreign policy – the Transylvanian Diet at Klausenburg voted for Union with 
Hungary on 29 May 1848.21 Ultimately, Transylvania was governed from Budapest for 
only a short time before civil war broke out between Habsburg loyalist forces (led by the 
Croats under Josip Jelačić) and the defenders of the Hungarian government. In the 
conflict, the Saxons and Romanians generally sided with the Habsburgs, while many 
moderate Magyars, such as Ferenc Deák, István Széchenyi and József Eötvös, could not 
take the step of opposing their King and retired from active politics. Nevertheless, Lajos 
Kossuth and his supporters fought on until their capitulation to Russian forces at Világos 
on 11 August 1849.22 
From 1849 to 1867 the Habsburg Monarchy underwent a series of transformations 
as Emperor Francis Joseph and successive governments attempted to achieve social, 
political and national equilibrium. Initially, Transylvania was governed directly from 
Vienna which included the removal of Saxon autonomy in 1853. Following military 
defeat and internal pressure, Emperor Francis Joseph introduced in quick succession the 
federalist October Diploma of 1860 and the more centralist February Patent of 1861. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Broos/Orǎştice/Szászváros. 
21 Klausenburg/Cluj/Kolozsvár. 
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new centralist system was based on a unitary Empire-wide constitution, an Imperial 
parliament sitting in Vienna and overall Austro-German predominance. As German 
speakers the Saxons were important potential supporters of the new system and their 
autonomy was revived by the Imperial government in May 1861. The Saxons even sat 
with the Romanian representatives in a reconstituted Transylvanian Diet at Hermannstadt 
from 1863 which, along with passing a host of progressive laws, duly sent delegates to 
the central parliament in Vienna from 1863 to 1865.23 Yet the Magyar political elite led 
by Ferenc Deák refused to reconcile with the Viennese government, defended the 
legitimacy of the early 1848 laws (while distancing themselves from the later excesses) 
and boycotted both the Transylvanian Diet and the Viennese parliament. By 1865, amidst 
foreign policy setbacks and boycotts from the Czechs and Magyars, the February Patent 
system was clearly breaking down. Defeat by Prussian forces in 1866 prompted Francis 
Joseph to decide for reconciliation with Hungary, which eventually resulted in the 1867 
Ausgleich, forming the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It essentially left domestic affairs to 
the Hungarian government while the Emperor-King retained control of foreign policy, the 
armed forces and financial matters. The reconvened Transylvanian Diet, now meeting at 
Klausenburg with a manufactured Magyar majority, repeated the action of 1848 and 
voted for Union with Hungary.24 Thus, after years of uncertainty, the 1867 dualist system 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 Hellburg/Világos/Şiria. 
23 The Hermannstadt Diet which sat from 1863 to 1865 is covered well in S. Retegan, ‘Die 
Siebenbürgischen Landtage 1848 bis 1865’ in H. Rumpler and P. Urbanitsch, eds., Die 
Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. Vol. 7: Verfassung und Parlamentarismus. Part 2: Die Regionalen 
Repräsentativkörperschaften (Vienna, 2000), pp. 2326-43. The importance of this Diet for the Romanians, 
the first time they were accepted in the Transylvanian Diet as equals, is highlighted in K. Hitchins, ‘The 
Rumanians of Transylvania and the Ausgleich, 1865-1869’, in L. Holotík, ed., Der österreichisch-
ungarische Ausgleich (Bratislava, 1971), pp. 860-96. 
24 There is a good collection of documents providing a background to this action and later attempts for 
Union in Aemtliche Actenstücke, betreffend die Verhandlungen über die Union Siebenbürgens mit dem 
Königreiche Ungarn, 2 Vols. (Hermannstadt, 1865-66). 
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gradually took hold and it would be the Hungarian government, with an unbreakable 
majority in the Budapest parliament, which would decide future policies in Transylvania.  
The Saxon politicians were split into two factions over the new Hungarian 
government. The ‘Old Saxons’, based in the conservative provincial, bureaucratic capital 
of Hermannstadt, advocated continued adherence to Saxon local autonomy and 
opposition to Transylvania’s Union with Hungary. There was even talk of a possible 
parliamentary boycott since there was widespread belief that the dualist system would not 
last long.25 On the other hand, the ‘Young Saxons’, mostly from the more mixed, vibrant 
Kronstadt, argued for co-operation with the Hungarian political elite on the basis of a 
common progressive, liberal programme.26 In the towns of Reps and Schäßburg there was 
also strong support for the ‘Young Saxons’.27 While the main reason for the split was the 
willingness (or not) to co-operate with the Magyar political elite over the construction of 
a liberal Hungarian state, other factors also played a role. Traditional rivalry between 
Hermannstadt and Kronstadt, the different milieus of the towns, generational tension and 
personal clashes contributed, as well as pragmatic calculations about railway routes to the 
Orient.28 
                                                 
25 Teutsch, Georg Daniel Teutsch, 232. There is a good representation of ‘Old Saxon’ views in the 
memorandum sent to the Monarch dated 3 March 1866 which is reproduced as an appendix in Teutsch, 
Georg Daniel Teutsch, pp. 568-83. 
26 See C. Göllner, ‘Erwartungen und Enttäuschungen der Siebenbürger Sachsen (1867-1876)’, Forschungen 
zur Volks- und Landeskunde 30 (1987) 2, pp. 9-36 and Göllner, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen, 128-36. 
27 Teutsch, Georg Daniel Teutsch, p. 228. 
28 For comments on politics and railway lines see the short discussion in W. Bruckner, ‘Die politische 
Entwicklung von 1860-1876’ in Hundert Jahre sächsischer Kämpfe. Zehn Vorträge aus der Geschichte der 
Siebenbürger Sachsen im letzten Jahrhundert (Hermannstadt, 1896), pp. 253-8. By the 1860s the two 
possible routes were Budapest-Klausenburg-Kronstadt (ie. bypassing Hermannstadt) or Budapest- Unter-
Wintz/Alvinc/Vinţu de Jos– Hermannstadt - Roten Turm Pass/Pasul Turnul Roşu/Vöröstoronyi-Szoros (ie. 
bypassing Kronstadt). For background see G. Rosegger and J. Jensen, ‘Transylvanian Railways and Access 
to the Lower Danube, 1856-1914’, East European Quarterly 29 (1996), pp. 427-48 and M. Tanase, 
‘Railways, towns and villages in Transylvania (Romania): Impact of the Railways on Urban and Rural 
Morphology’ in R. Roth and M. Polino, eds., The City and Railway in Europe (Burlington, 2003), pp. 45-
60. Eventually the railway was built running through Kronstadt. 
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Part of the disunity of the Saxons can be attributed to the contrasting 
characteristics and traditions of Saxon towns.29 For example, the two main Saxon centres 
– Kronstadt and Hermannstadt – were very different. Kronstadt was a bustling, industrial, 
trading town where the ‘Young Saxons’ predominated. Its dynamism and openness could 
explain the ‘Young Saxons’ willingness to co-operate with the Hungarian government in 
the 1860s and 1870s, especially while the issue of the main railway route to the Black 
Sea remained undecided. By contrast, Hermannstadt was an administrative, religious, 
military and institutional centre with a more conventional and cautious outlook. In the 
uncertain days of 1865-67, the ‘Old Saxons’ based in Hermannstadt appealed directly to 
the Monarch, defended their privileges and asserted Transylvania’s separate existence – 
all traditional tactics based on historical legal arguments.  The ‘Old Saxons’, unlike the 
‘Young Saxons’, were reluctant to embrace the new dualist, liberal system and its 
possibilities. Instead they looked to entrenched authority which, in the context of the mid-
1860s, meant Emperor Francis Joseph in Vienna. 
Over time there were important changes both politically and demographically to 
the different milieus of Hermannstadt and Kronstadt. In Hermannstadt the Saxon 
community remained dominant in local institutions, in the economy and in overall 
numbers. While there was growth in both Romanian and Hungarian residents in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, there was never a threat to local German dominance.30 
Hermannstadt also formed the centre of Romanian activity – being the home to the 
                                                 
29 For some background see H. Roth, ed., Handbuch der Historischen Stätten: Siebenbürgen (Stuttgart, 
2003) which provides a general overview of the major towns. id., Hermannstadt. Kleine Geschichte einer 
Stadt in Siebenbürgen (Cologne – Weimer – Vienna, 2006) and id., Kronstadt in Siebenbürgen. Eine kleine 
Stadtgeschichte (Cologne – Weimer – Vienna, 2010) provides some good background information.  
30 In 1880 the town numbered 14,327 Germans, 2,065 Hungarians and 2,810 Romanians and in 1910 
16,832 Germans, 7,252 Hungarians, 8,824 Romanians. 
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Metropolitan Bishop and to organisations like the Romanian cultural organization 
ASTRA – and relations between the German and Romanian population were normally 
quite good. In politics the Saxons’ attitudes towards dualism and the associated Magyar 
hegemony gradually moved from early opposition to resigned co-operation. In the mid to 
late 1880s, a grouping called the ‘Blacks’, which included many ‘Old Saxons’, despaired 
at any possible change in the political system and argued for a rapprochement with the 
present entrenched authority in Budapest, even contemplating formal co-operation with 
the Hungarian government. This pro-government line was coupled with an increased 
focus on economic, cultural and organisational activities on a local level. For example, 
the Saxon leader Karl Wolff resigned from the editorship of the influential 
Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tagesblatt to become a bank director and vocal advocate of 
Saxon associations. Throughout his long life Wolff worked tirelessly for the Saxon 
community but his approach changed from a stance of direct confrontation in his youth 
towards a gradual acceptance of the existing political situation in the mid 1880s. As a 
young law student in Heidelberg in the late 1860s, Wolff – a native of Schäßburg – wrote 
a number of prominent newspaper articles opposing Magyar interference in Saxon affairs. 
He worked at the prestigious Neue Freie Presse both in Vienna and then as its Budapest 
correspondent before returning to Transylvania to edit the Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches 
Tagesblatt. In this role and then as a parliamentary representative in Budapest, he quickly 
became immersed in Saxon and Hermannstadt’s politics. Throughout the 1870s and early 
1880s in print and in parliament Wolff openly challenged the government’s policies.31 By 
                                                 
31 See Kroner’s introduction in K. Wolff, Schriften und Reden (Michael Kroner, ed.) (Bucharest, 1976), pp.  
7-40 which provides a good, short overview of Wolff’s life in the centre of the Saxon community. See also 
R. Ungar, ‘Carl Wolff (1849-1929) in Dieter Drotleff, ed., Taten und Gestalten. Bilder aus der 
Vergangenheit der Rumäniendeutschen, 2 Vols, I (Hermannstadt, 2002), pp. 106-10; C. Göllner, ‘Karl 
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the mid 1880s, however, despairing at the Saxon situation and resigned to Magyar 
political dominance, he retired from public life and worked behind the scenes for a 
political compromise which would include official Saxon support for the government in 
Budapest.  
The political attitudes of Kronstadt’s Saxon community moved in the opposite 
direction to Hermannstadt’s. In the 1860s Kronstadt was the centre of the ‘Young Saxon’ 
movement arguing for co-operation with the Hungarian government in Budapest. By the 
early 1890s, however, Kronstadt’s younger Saxon generation had coalesced into the 
German nationalist ‘Green’ movement which preached opposition to the Hungarian 
government; even countenancing alliances with other minority groups. This change can 
be attributed to a number of factors. There was considerable concern over the situation of 
the Saxon people amongst the younger generation of politicians, particularly in light of 
the ‘Blacks’ opportunistic rapprochement with the Hungarian government. In addition, 
the Hungarian government’s centralising policies showed no sign of abatement, with or 
without the co-operation of the Saxons. Finally, Kronstadt’s demographic dynamics also 
played a role. In 1880 Kronstadt had an almost balanced mix of nationalities (9,599 
German, 9,508 Magyar, 9,079 Romanian), though the Saxons dominated local politics 
and business. While there was some evidence of informal ghettos – German speakers 
concentrating in the inner city around the Black Church and Honterus Gymnasium with 
the Romanians in the upper city and the Hungarians in the suburbs – relations between 
nationalities were characterised by pragmatism and tolerance. Over the next thirty years, 
however, Kronstadt’s demographics changed considerably. By 1910 the Hungarian-
                                                                                                                                                 
Wolff’s Politisches und Wirtschaftliches Wirken’, Forschungen zur Volks- und Landeskunde 16 (1973), pp. 
5-38 and F. Sachsenheim, Unvergeßliches aus dem Leben Karl Wolff’s (Schäßburg, 1933), written by the 
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speaking population had risen substantially to relative prominence (10 841 German, 17 
831 Magyar, 11 786 Romanian) while the Romanian speakers were also growing at a 
faster rate than Kronstadt’s Saxons. These trends were expected to continue and 
presented a considerable challenge to Saxon dominance at a local level.32  
Thus the Saxon experience of late political life in the Habsburg Monarchy – with 
its elections, parliaments, heightened nationalism, constitutional government, 
organisational life and state building in a time of immense social and demographic 
changes – was individualised, localised, extremely varied and changed over time. In the 
founding years of dualism the ‘Young Saxon’ movement demonstrated that there was a 
real chance for an understanding between the dominant Hungarian government and the 
less intransigent Saxon politicians. Yet over the next decade, in piecemeal fashion, the 
Saxons lost many aspects of their local autonomy and faced continual pressure from the 
government’s drive for a modern, Magyar-dominated, unitary nation-state. Particularly 
contested was the 1876 law stripping the Universitas Saxonum of its rights and privileges 
while Transylvania’s administrative districts were also fundamentally redrawn to favour 
the Magyar-speaking population.33 The Saxon community were again divided over 
                                                                                                                                                 
husband of Wolff’s niece and containing extracts from personal correspondence and family reminisences. 
32 Here Kronstadt presents some parallels to the situation in Bohemia where the migration of Czech 
speakers to previously German-language towns created much national tension, though there were long-
standing traditions of co-existence in Transylvania and the Saxons had no pretence of an overarching 
central state protecting their interests. See M. Cornwall, ‘The Struggle on the Czech-German Language 
Border, 1880-1940’, ante, CIX (1994), 914-51.  
33 For accounts of the process see E. Neugeboren, ‘Die Zertrümmerung des Sachsenlandes 1876’ in 
Teutsch, Bilder aus der vaterländischen Geschichte, pp. 361-72, Göllner, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen, pp. 
160-9, C. Göllner, ‘Die Auflösung der sächsichen Nationsuniversität (1876). Vorgeschichte und Folgen’ in 
W. Kessler, ed., Gruppenautonomie in Siebenbürgen. 500 Jahre siebenbürgisch-sächsiche 
Nationsuniversität (Cologne and Vienna, 1990), pp. 355-66, F. Gottas, ‘Das Ende der Nationsuniversität 
und deren Ablösung durch die evangelische Kirche im Spiegel der Berichterstattung des Siebenbürgisch-
Deutschen Tageblattes’ in Kessler, Gruppenautonomie in Siebenbürgen, pp. 367-88 and F. Gottas, Ungarn 
im Zeitalter des Hochliberalismus. Studien zur Tisza-Ära (1875-1890) (Vienna, 1976), pp. 191-2. The 
transcripts of the parliamentary debate were published in Die Zertrümmerung des Siebenbürger 
Sachsenlandes. Nach den Debaten des ungarischen Landtages am 22, 23, 24 und 27 März 1876 (Munich, 
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political tactics. Some, such as the respected economist and historian Oscar von Meltzl, 
insisted that the Saxons had to work with the government in Budapest.34 Others, such as 
Karl Wolff, fought vigorously against the 1876 law.   
The situation for the Transylvanian Saxons in the early 1880s therefore reflected 
the realities of the Monarchy’s dualist structure and Saxons’ position as a small, 
vulnerable minority within a greater Hungary. While the Saxons had traditionally been a 
significant, privileged minority in Transylvania, they were a mere 1% of greater 
Hungary’s population. Adolf Zay, the parliamentary representative for Mühlbach, when 
discussing political tactics concerning the 1879 Trefort Education Laws, which required 
the teaching of the Hungarian language in primary schools, noted in a private letter that if 
two million Romanians and two million South Slavs could not prevent the law, then 
200,000 Saxons would not make any difference.35 Practically, in the absence of 
substantive local autonomy, the Saxons needed allies in the new political world. The 
‘Young Saxons’ (and increasingly in the 1870s some ‘Old Saxons’ as well) believed in 
working with the Hungarian government in Budapest. There had been a long history of 
co-operation with the Hungarian nobles in Transylvania based on respect for Saxon 
autonomy and common membership in the Diet and many Saxons believed co-operation 
with the Hungarian government in Budapest was the best course. Others, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
1876). For a good short introduction to the institution of the Universitas see W. Kessler, ‘Universitas 
Saxonum – Personenverband – Gruppenautonomie – Volksgruppe’ in Kessler, Gruppenautonomie in 
Siebenbürgen, pp. 3-27. The Universitas’s sole purpose after the 1876 law was to administer its collective 
property, which included school funding.      
34 See, for example, O. Meltzl, Die Stellung der Siebenbürgen Sachsen in Ungarn (Hermannstadt, 1878). 
Franz Gebbel, a highly regarded journalist and the first editor of the Siebenbürgen Deutsches Wochenblatt, 
also argued for co-operation with the Hungarian government, even during the events of 1876, as did Guido 
von Baußnern. Baußnern, Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn, 73-82.  
35 Letter dated 26 February 1879 from Adolf Zay to Georg Daniel Teutsch. M. Vlaicu, ed., Briefe an Georg 
Daniel Teutsch (Bucharest, 1994), p. 246. These sentiments were echoed by Karl Wolff in 1895when there 
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looked elsewhere for possible political allies. For a short period in the 1860s the Saxons 
had worked in harness with centralist, liberal Austro-German circles and Transylvanian 
Romanian representatives, yet after the dualist settlement of 1867 the Austrian 
government and politicians were no longer prepared to intervene in the Hungarian half of 
the Monarchy and few Saxons contemplated an alliance with the Romanians alone. The 
newly formed Imperial Germany was another matter. The Saxons had long standing 
educational links with Protestant Germany and there had been a number of pamphlets in 
Germany during the 1870s detailing the Magyarizing policies and the Saxon plight.36 
Moreover, Germany and Austria-Hungary had formed the Dual Alliance in 1879 which 
brought an official, diplomatic status to Germany’s relations with the Habsburg 
Monarchy. Many Saxon leaders welcomed moral and financial support from Germany 
without wanting to upset the government in Budapest. Within this complex political 
constellation, the Saxons attempted to balance a defence of their identity (the 
characteristic which impressed Emily Gerard so much) with a general recognition of 
Hungarian political dominance. The myriad of Saxon viewpoints pointed to the difficulty 
of this balancing act.    
     
*** 
 
On 8 and 9 June 1881, in anticipation of imminent parliamentary elections, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
was a discussion about founding a Saxon national party following the model of the Romanians. See 
Göllner, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen in den Jahren 1848-1918, pp. 196-7.  
36 For example, [Anon.], ‘Ungarn und die Sachsen in Siebenbürgen (Aus Hermannstadt)’ in H. Treitschke 
and W. Wehrenpfennig, eds., Preussische Jahrbücher 29 (1872), pp. 629-39; F. Löher, Die Magyaren und 
andere Ungarn (Leipzig, 1874) and W. Wattenbach, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen. Ein Vortrag (Munich, 
1882 orig. 1870). 
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Kronstädter Programme for a Saxon People’s Party (Kronstädter Programme der 
Sächsischen Volkspartei) was drawn up. Its argument for strict opposition to the 
government only reflected one current in Transylvanian Saxon politics yet its formation 
and growing influence reflected the change in tone after the 1876 Law severely curtailed 
the Universitas Saxonum’s rights and privileges.37 The Church and the various Saxon 
cultural associations became increasingly important as administrative autonomy was 
reduced and the official Universitas lost its powers.  
With the onset of Eduard Taaffe’s conservative-Slav Iron Ring government in 
Austria (1879-1893), a similar process towards opposition and national defence was 
occurring amongst German speakers in Austria. Taaffe’s ministers were taken from 
conservative, Czech and Polish ranks while the Austro-German liberals were confined to 
vigorous protests in parliament and at public meetings. In these circumstances the 
Deutscher Schulverein founded in Vienna (DSV) quickly became the most important 
association dedicated to the defence of Deutschtum. Founded on 2 July 1880 by a group 
of young nationalists, the DSV had phenomenal success and within three years had 
100,000 members and 761 local organisations covering all the major German-speaking 
Austrian cities. Soon almost every public figure in Austrian-German life was compelled 
to display prominently their membership and activity in the DSV.38 Austrian law 
prevented the DSV interfering in the affairs of Hungary, especially for such a sensitive 
region as Transylvania, nevertheless there was evident interest in the Transylvanian 
Saxon situation from among the members of the various overlapping German nationalist 
                                                 
37 For some background see F. Gottas, ‘Zur Nationalitätenpolitik in Ungarn unter der 
Ministerpräsidentschaft Kálmán Tiszas’, Südostdeutsches Archiv 17/18 (1974-75), pp. 89-96. 
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associations in Austria.39 In early 1881 there was intense communication between the 
DSV and certain groups within Imperial Germany about setting up a similar association 
in Berlin.40 
 Already a number of informal groups in Imperial Germany had expressed concern 
at the condition of German-speaking communities in Austria and Hungary. Heinrich 
Treitschke and Theodor Mommsen at the University of Berlin led various groups 
concerned with so-called Auslandsdeutschen, while in Leipzig an association for trade 
and German interests in foreign lands was having regular meetings under the leadership 
of Ernst Hasse, who would later gain prominence as the leader of the Pan-German 
League. As early as November 1880 a related Zentralverein für Handelsgeographie 
based in Berlin was in contact with the DSV arguing for an active, expansionist German 
colonial policy. At a local meeting in Berlin on 23 June 1881 the central figure, Julius 
Falkenstein, spoke of the ‘stormy actions of the Hungarians and Czechs against the 
German population’.41 
 The momentum to form an association which would encompass the various 
groupings led to the foundation of the ADS in Berlin on 15 August 1881. Prominent 
                                                                                                                                                 
38 Even the arrogant, Anglophile Ernst von Plener, son of a Minister and from a family of bureaucrats, 
defended the role of the Deutscher Schulverein when he made political speeches. For example, E. Plener, 
Reden von Ernst von Plener 1873 bis 1910 (Stuttgart, 1911), pp. 514 and 652.  
39 For example see Zur Lage der Siebenbürger Sachsen. Flugblatt des Deutschen Vereins in Wien (Munich, 
1878), which contains a strongly German nationalist speech from Victor Capesius and a copy of an article 
from the Neue Freie Presse which conceded that with the 1867 Ausgleich the Saxons had been sacrificed to 
Hungarian dominance. 
40 The link is outlined in W. Wattenbach,  Der Allgemeine Deutsche Schulverein zum Schutz bedrängter 
Deutscher im Ausland. Seine Ziele und Bestrebungen (Berlin, 1884).  
41 Quoted in Weidenfeller, ADV, 155. For a general background to the formation of the ADS see 
Wattenbach, Der Allgemeine Deutsche Schulverein, pp. 3-31, R. Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most 
German. A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886-1914 (Boston, 1984), pp. 29-33, G. Haude and 
K. Poßekel, ‘Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA)’ in Dieter Fricke, ed., Die bürgerlichen 
Parteien in Deutschland. Handbuch der Geschichte der bürgerlichen Parteien und anderer bürgerlicher 
Interessenorganisationen vom Vormärz bis zum Jahre 1945 (Leipzig, 1970), pp. 716-29 and especially 
Weidenfeller, ADV, pp. 140-65. 
20 
 
[Type text] 
 
professors such as Wilhelm Wattenbach and Wilhelm Groos, both visitors to 
Transylvania in 1875, were involved in the ADS from the outset. Karl Wolff was invited 
to Berlin to meet the board of the ADS and he expressed a desire to deepen economic ties 
though there was no mention of direct aid. Perhaps Wolff was cautious because of the 
Hungarian government’s sensitivity to outside interference. It was not surprising that the 
first open letter from the ADS, which appeared in November 1881, made specific 
reference to the position in Transylvania. The phrasing is indicative of the ADS’s 
thinking. 
Above all, it is the Germans in Hungary and Transylvania who need our help. 
Despite legal guarantees for the equality of languages, the dominant Magyar 
minority has for the last few years worked seriously to destroy German education 
in the lands of the Hungarian crown … the Magyars should thank the Germans for 
their freedom from Turkish domination as well as the light of European culture 
that has reached the Hungarian lands … the organisation of the Allgemeiner 
Deutscher Schulverein would like to be in the position to build a shield, which 
would operate wherever modern barbarism threatens the areas of German culture 
(Bildung). 42 
 
The trope of honest, universal German culture working to civilise the wilds of the 
barbaric East reflected the mindset of the activists and formed a constant refrain in the 
German-speaking populations of Central and Eastern Europe.  
The ADS became a focal point in a concerted effort to rouse German public 
opinion in defence of the Transylvanian Saxons and other German speakers in Hungary. 
On 7 December 1881 one of the ADS’s prominent leaders, Robert Jannasch, called on the 
German press and politicians to help the plight of the Saxons. 
The meeting therefore asks the German press as well as the parliamentarians of all 
German parties to stand up for the benefit of the Germans in Hungary and 
Transylvania against the threat of Magyarization. This is necessary because of the 
duty to a German branch (Stamm) as well as our own national pride.43 
                                                 
42 Quoted in Weidenfeller, ADV, p. 172. 
43 Quoted in Barta and Bell, Geschichte der Schutzarbeit am deutschen Volkstum, p. 128. 
21 
 
[Type text] 
 
 
Already, there had been an important article in the 1881 Preussische Jahrbücher on the 
Hungarian Germans (with a case study of the Saxon town, Mühlbach) updating the 
readers about the Magyarization process of recent years.44  
The appearance of a lengthy brochure from a Professor at Heidelberg, Rudolf 
Heinze then stoked the flames. In his brochure, Heinze described the process of 
Magyarization  -  the replacement of officials and teachers, the pressure placed on 
German language and education, the attacks against the Universitas Saxonum and self-
autonomy, among other actions  -  before extolling the achievements of the German-
speaking population, especially the foundation of towns and the building of civilisation 
through German culture and hard work.45 In a systematic exposition of various laws and 
regulations, Heinze attempted to prove that Magyarization was the absolutely dominant 
central point of the Hungarian state.46 In conclusion, Heinze asserted his credentials as an 
academic stating that he had used a scholarly approach and had tried to show things as 
they were. He cautioned that the overwhelming power of the state coupled with Magyar 
race fanaticism constituted a dangerous combination. Finally, he finished by appealing 
for Germans to help their Saxon brothers as a matter of honour.47  
 The ADS then published a brochure under the name of Karl Ludolf, in fact 
written by Johann Wolff – a Rector in Mühlbach, Transylvania – which went over much 
                                                 
44 [Anon.], ‘Die Deutschenhetze in Ungarn (Aus Ungarn)’ in H. Treitschke, ed., Preussische Jahrbücher 47 
(1881), pp. 41-8. The author was probably Georg Daniel Teutsch who had friendly relations with the editor 
Heinrich Treitschke. See Vlaicu, Briefe an Georg Daniel Teutsch, p. 189. See also G. Rath, Siebenbürgen 
Reisebeobachtungen und Studien (Nach Vorträgen für wohlthätige Zwecke gehalten zu Duisburg am 13 
November 1878 und zu Bonn am 3 Februar 1879) (Heidelberg, 1880).  
45 R. Heinze, Hungarica. Eine Anklageschrift (Freiburg, 1882), pp. 25-50 
46 Ibid, p. 91. 
47 Ibid, pp. 122-6. 
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of the same territory as Heinze’s.48 Throughout the brochure, Johann Wolff used such 
terms as ‘Magyar tyranny of language’ [magyarische Sprachtyrannei] and the ‘Magyar 
Inquisition’ [die magyarische Inquisition] as well as the typical ‘German hard-work and 
perseverance’ [deutscher Fleiss und deutsche Ausdauer].49 The brochure contained an 
introduction from Julius Falkenstein of the ADS and in an appendix at the end published 
the association’s statutes. The first paragraph of the statutes notes that ‘[t]he “Deutsche-
Schulverein” has the purpose of supporting Germans outside the Reich to retain their 
Deutschtum and to strengthen their attempts to remain German or to become German 
again’.50 The statutes went on to mention specific aid such as the erection of schools and 
libraries, the provision of German books, writings and teachers.51  
A separate inflammatory brochure, not directly on the Transylvanian Saxons, but 
dealing with the general situation in the Habsburg Monarchy appeared in Munich around 
this time.52 This prompted a vigorous, specific reply defending the Magyar viewpoint, 
especially the status of Hungary as a civilised European nation.53 Adding further fuel to 
the fire, a lecture given by Wattenbach in 1870 was republished by the ADS with a new 
preface reviewing the recent wave of publications and a sober afterword describing the 
imminent Mittelschule law.54 Yet another lengthy brochure appeared in 1882, this one 
                                                 
48 [J. Wolf], Der Sprachen-und Völkerkampf in Ungarn. Ein Bericht- und Mahnwort an das deutsche Volk 
(Leipzig, 1882). The attribution is found in F. Teutsch, Siebenbürgische Geschichte für das sachsische 
Volk, Vol. 4, p. 86. 
49 [Wolf], Sprachen-und Völkerkampf, pp. 26, 28 and 76. 
50 Ibid, p. 86. See also Statuten des Allgemeinen Deutschen Schul-vereins zur Erhaltung des Deutschtums 
im Auslande (Berlin, [1881?]). 
51 Ibid. 
52 J. Sepp, Ein Volk von zehn Millionen oder Der Bayernstamm, Herkunft und Ausbreitung über Oestreich, 
Kärnthen, Steyermark und Tyrol. Kampfschrift wider Czechen und Magyaren (Munich, 1882). 
53 K. Tóth, Vertheidigung der Ungarn gegen Prof. Dr. Johann Sepp’s Angriffe. Als Erwiderung auf die im 
Werke ‘Ein Volk von zehn Millionen oder der Bayerstamm. Eine Kampfschirft gegen Czechen und 
Magyaren’ erhobenen Anklagen (Pressburg, 1884), pp. 12-13.  
54 W. Wattenbach, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen. Ein Vortrag (Munich, 1882). 
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from the hand of C. F. Maurer with a preface from Wattenbach.55 The sentiments in this 
brochure mirrored those of the ADS and the now voluminous German-language literature 
on the Transylvanian Saxon dilemma.56 
 Such negative sustained interest in their country could only provoke the Magyars, 
who were more accustomed to fighting Vienna’s interference and thus receiving the 
approbation of European public opinion. Hungary’s relations with Imperial Germany had 
been, in general, very good. Indeed one of Hungary’s greatest statesmen, Gyula 
Andrássy, had negotiated the Dual Alliance with Bismarck. For a number of reasons the 
Dual Alliance proved a natural fit. First, there were many German speakers spread 
throughout the Monarchy. Second, Bohemia and the Alpine Lands had been part of the 
Holy Roman Empire for centuries, thus a certain historical affinity had always existed 
with the various German-speaking lands. This was reflected in the election of 
representatives to the 1848 Frankfurt Parliament from Bohemia and the Alpine lands and 
the associated idea of a Großdeutschland. Third, as mentioned previously, during the mid 
to late nineteenth century there was a general perception that a great confrontation 
between civilisation and barbarity would occur, thus determining the course of history. 
This powerful mix of enlightenment concepts (levels of civilisation), historical teleology 
(primarily inspired by Hegel but also expressed in terms such as ‘destiny’ and ‘fate’), 
ethnic and racial thinking (given impetus by Herder) and grand Darwinist inspired 
theories of evolution provided the background to much decision making.57 For example, 
amongst the multitude of complex reasons for the installation of the 1867 dualist system, 
                                                 
55 C. F. Maurer, Die Besitzergreifung Siebenbürgens durch die das Land jetzt bewohnenden Nationen 
(Berlin, 1882). 
56 Ibid. 
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one of the underlying bases was the idea of the Germans and Magyars as Staatsvölker; in 
other words, civilised peoples who deserved to oversee the progress of state, society and 
culture. These sentiments were evident in many Transylvanian Saxon pamphlets, which 
argued for common interests of the Saxons and Magyars to counter the threat from the 
Slavs and, less often mentioned, the Romanians.58 There were understandable concerns in 
Magyar circles that elements within its ally and ‘natural’ partner were criticising 
Hungarian domestic policies. The response was swift.  
Ambros Neményi in the New Year’s edition of the Ungarische Revue laid out the 
Magyar arguments. Neményi was provoked to respond, he explained, because a number 
of famous professors had signed the ADS’s open letter.59 He traced the agitation to a 
small clique among the Transylvanian Saxons since other Germans in Hungary were not 
interested in the ADS’s activities and were, in fact, assimilating into Hungarian culture 
and society.60 This Saxon clique, argued Neményi, had misled the ADS and the German 
public with false information. For example, Hungary had a free press which would allow 
discussion of the ADS’s letter. Would a similar letter from a German socialist or a French 
                                                                                                                                                 
57 For the coalescence of these factors in Imperial German thinking around the mid-nineteenth century see 
Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, The German Myth of the East. 1800 to the Present (Oxford, 2009), pp. 71-97. 
58 For example, Guido von Baußnern, a prominent Saxon politician close to Hungarian circles, argued for 
co-operation between the Germans and Hungarians on the basis of a common cultural mission. [G. 
Baußnern], Das Erwürgen der deutschen Nationalität in Ungarn. Denkschrift aus Siebenbürgen mit 
Vorwort von Franz von Löher (Munich, 1874), pp. 56-9 and idem, Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn. 
Abhandlungen, Reden und Briefe 1868-1889 (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 12-25 and 47-57. This issue has been 
discussed, among much else in German-Hungarian relations, in R.J.W. Evans, ‘Hungary and the German 
Lands in the Nineteenth Century’ in Evans, Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs, pp. 228-41. From the 
German perspective see also W. Mommsen, ‘Österreich-Ungarn aus der Sicht des deutschen Kaiserreichs’ 
in H. Rumpler, ed., Innere Staatsbildung und Gesellschaftliche Modernisierung in Österreich und 
Deutschland 1867/71-1914 (Munich, 1991), p. 208. 
59 A. Neményi, Hungaricae Res. Ein Commentar zu dem Aufruf des ‘Allgemeinen Deutschen Schulvereins’ 
in Angelegenheit der Unterdrückung der Deutschen in Ungarn und Siebenbürgen (Budapest, 1882), p. 5. 
This originally appeared in the 1 January 1882 edition of the Ungarische Revue. 
60 Ibid, pp. 6 and 32. 
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nationalist in Alsace have been possible?, asked Neményi.61 In addition, Neményi 
queried whether the ADS had read the School laws which respected the 15 different 
languages in Hungary while instigating the study of a necessary common language 
(Magyar), just as in Belgium or Posen.62 In fact, Neményi continued, many German 
speakers wanted to learn Magyar and there was an informal exchange system with 
Magyar families to facilitate this.63 He also challenged the notion that the Germans had 
freed Hungary from the Turks. Rather, Neményi countered, wasn’t it the Hungarians who 
had for centuries protected the Germans (and Europe) from the Turks!64 At the root of 
Neményi’s vigorous defence was the assertion that Hungary was only doing what all 
Western European countries were doing; namely nation-building and state 
consolidation.65 This meant that outdated Saxon privileges had to be reduced or abolished 
and the Magyar language learnt by all Hungarian citizens. The only people who opposed 
this, concluded Neményi, were the Transylvanian Saxons. They were causing a 
disturbance to both the Dual Alliance and the underlying alliance of German and 
Hungarian peoples (Völker).66 
The fundamental lines of battle had become clear. First, there was the 
disagreement over rights, laws and the requirements of a modern cultured state. The 
Magyars argued for a standardised administrative and legal system, whereas most Saxons 
continued to insist on their historical and natural rights as guaranteed by various promises 
and the Nationality Law of 1868. Second, the place of the Magyars and Germans in 
                                                 
61 Ibid, p. 7. 
62 Ibid, pp. 11-14. Posen was often mentioned by Magyar commentators since Imperial Germany had strong 
nationalizing policies in this former region of Poland, including Bismarck’s famous Prussian Settlement 
Commission set up in 1886. 
63 Ibid, p. 18. 
64 Ibid, pp. 25-6. 
65 Ibid, pp. 30-1. 
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Western European history was heavily disputed. The Magyars conceived of themselves 
as the noble defenders of Western Christendom, the Eastern outpost of civilisation and 
culture. The Transylvanian Saxons and their German supporters, however, emphasised 
their own contribution to centuries of Christian defence (however ambiguous this really 
was in Transylvania’s case), arguing for recognition of their role on the frontier of 
Western civilisation. 
 The debate escalated when it breached the walls of the Hungarian parliament. 
Ottó Herman, a former zoologist in the Transylvanian Museum and radical Independent 
nationalist parliamentarian, called into question a budget allocation of 200,000 florins for 
the Transylvanian Saxons. Herman immediately mentioned the ADS’s actions in 
Germany as being a direct attack against the Magyar nation.67 He openly questioned the 
loyalty of the Transylvanian Saxons, citing a previous comment by the Saxon politician 
Guido von Baußnern that the Honvéd uniform was inconsistent with Deutschtum, as well 
as Karl Wolff’s use of the word ‘Magyar gluttony’ [Magyarenfresserei]. Herman 
continued in the same vein. In particular the unification of Germany in 1871, according to 
Herman, had shown: 
that the victory of the great German nation was desired by countless sons of 
Saxon nationality, [who also wanted] to lay down their Hungarian citizenship and 
[despite being] in the territory of the Hungarian Crown feel as a part of the great 
German nation, and therefore to found a State within a State…68 
  
Herman added that the scandal being played out in the German press and public opinion 
was against all laws and justice, thus warranting official action from the Hungarian 
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68 Ibid, 3. See also Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tagesblatt, 30 January 1882 ‘Debatte über die Bewegung in 
Deutschland’. 
27 
 
[Type text] 
 
government. 
 Herman’s speech could not fail to provoke the Saxon representatives. First, Karl 
Wolff, giving his maiden speech in the Hungarian parliament, spoke and defended the 
movement in Germany. The Saxons, he said, merely wished to stay true to their 
nationality.69 Josef Gull, the representative from Großau, welcomed the German nation’s 
desire to help and defended Heinze’s claims of Magyarization.70 For his forthrightness, 
Gull was asked by the President of Parliament to retract his remarks, whereupon Gull 
switched from speaking Magyar to his native German. He repeated his assertions of 
Magyarization and defended his loyalty to his nationality.71 Herman replied that he did 
not want to destroy the ADS, simply to tell people the real state of affairs and paralyse 
the ADS’s effect on public opinion.72 
 The Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza responded in a relatively cool and 
pragmatic manner. The government, he said, will do its duty to combat the various anti-
Hungarian pamphlets. He also pointed out that there were many German speakers who 
were good Hungarian patriots, as opposed to the Transylvanian Saxons. He was 
undoubtedly referring to the scattered German communities throughout Hungary who did 
not have long traditions of privileges and were generally friendlier towards the Hungarian 
state idea. Finally, Tisza noted that there was little chauvinism in Hungary, especially 
compared to what was happening in Posen and Alsace-Lorraine.73 A member of the 
government party, Emerich Zvanka, in a neat reversal, then immediately proposed a 
200,000 florin fund to fight the negative propaganda in Germany. Blasius Orban 
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continued in this vein and highlighted the Magyars’ historical role in protecting Germany 
from the barbaric, Asiatic hordes.74 After further exchanges with the Transylvanian 
Saxon representatives, Tisza summed up the government’s position by affirming ‘that we 
nevertheless are all of one mind; that Hungary belongs to the Magyars and there can only 
be a Magyar state (general sustained acclaim and applause).’75 
 The German language press in Hungary reflected the disparate views both within 
the Transylvanian Saxon community and the wider German-speaking Hungarian 
population. The Pester Lloyd – based in Budapest and under the influence of the 
Hungarian government – complained of the German ‘schoolmaster illness’ (whereby the 
Germans could not resist interfering and passing judgment on other countries) and 
extolled the virtues of Hungary’s liberal institutions.76 Another Budapest-based paper, the 
Pester Journal, restricted its coverage to a reproduction of the parliamentary speeches, as 
did the venerable Preßburger Zeitung, published in Bratislava.77 
 Among the Saxon papers, the conservative Hermannstädter Zeitung expressed a 
conciliatory stance, reflecting a softening towards the Hungarian government by some 
within the ‘Old Saxon’ ranks. In a lengthy comment on the parliamentary debate, the 
editors isolated the two issues involved: first, the agitation against Hungary from the 
German Reich and, second, the implications for Deutschtum within Hungary.78 The 
newspaper showed concern that the Germans might use beautiful phrases in support of 
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the Saxons and then let them down.79 In fact, the Hermannstädter Zeitung declared no 
sympathy at all for the ADS, describing the Saxons as good citizens (Staatsbürger) and a 
quiet, peaceful people (ruhiges Volk). There should be no fear of Magyarization since 
whatever happened the Saxons would remain German. This pragmatic approach was 
highlighted in their conclusion: 
And if we hold fast to our German nationality, we are not lesser Hungarian 
citizens, because we know that for the Saxons, especially for political and cultural 
matters, the word ‘extra Hungariam non est vita’ [outside of Hungary there is no 
life] applies.80 
 
In a subsequent edition the Hermannstädter Zeitung was extremely critical of Heinze’s 
pamphlet describing it as ‘literary impertinence’ [literarische Frechheit] and its author as 
a ‘malicious babbler and slanderer’ [heimtückischen Schwätzer und Verleumder].81  
 At the other end of the Saxon political spectrum was the Kronstädter Zeitung 
which used strong language against the Hungarian government and its Magyarization 
policy. As already outlined, the Saxon political circles in Kronstadt were moving towards 
opposition since the railway issue had been resolved, increased migration was eroding 
Saxon influence and the institutions of the Hungarian state increasingly asserted Magyar 
dominance.  
The dominant nation of the land suffers from the passionate hate of Germans, 
suffers from the passion of Hungarian national selfishness … The Magyar hates 
the German! Why? Because the Germans want to remain, because the Magyar is 
afraid of the imaginary spectre of Germanisation.82 
 
The Kronstädter Zeitung continued in a similar vein a few days later in response to 
Herman’s parliamentary posturing and referred to the promises made in 1868: ‘[i]n a 
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cultured state promises and rights must be respected! Or does our [Hungarian] Fatherland 
want to somehow exclude itself from educated Europe?’83 In a summary of their point of 
view, the Kronstädter Zeitung published an editorial entitled ‘The Situation of the 
Saxons’, which pleaded for justice [Gerechtigkeit]. The specific demands were familiar: 
autonomy; use of the German language in church, school and with the state authorities; 
and the traditional property rights of the Universitas.84 Was this the talk from enemies of 
the state?, asked the Kronstädter Zeitung. Kronstadt was gradually becoming the centre 
of more assertive German nationalist politics.  
 An intermediate position was taken by Karl Wolff’s Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches 
Tagesblatt, which had the closest contact with the ADS. While the Siebenbürgisch-
Deutsches Tagesblatt did not use the emotive language of the Kronstädter Zeitung, it 
clearly welcomed the ADS’s actions and encouraged a balanced defence of Saxon rights 
and privileges. In its first extended comment on the parliamentary debate (the 
Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tagesblatt had reprinted all the speeches over the preceding 
week), the ADS’s intentions were defended.85 The Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tagesblatt 
continued to argue that being German speakers in Hungary did not mean disloyalty 
towards Hungary: ‘one thing we have achieved: we have defended our rights by all legal 
means!’86 Throughout the controversy, the Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tagesblatt reported 
on meetings and expressions of support from the greater German-speaking world – 
Zürich, Bern, Karlsruhe, Eberbach, Heidelberg, Leipzig, Munich, Mannheim, the 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung – giving the impression of a broad movement 
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encompassing much of Germany’s educated public.87 Thus the three contrasting views of 
political tactics – co-operation, opposition and principled defence – were all represented 
in the Saxon press. 
 Ottó Herman did not let the matter rest. He followed his 27 January speech with 
an official parliamentary interpellation on 15 February reiterating his belief that the real 
goal of the ADS movement was directed against the Hungarian nation.88 Herman listed 
the various recent German publications including Heinze’s, Ludolf’s and a number 
sponsored by the ADS (Wattenbach’s contributions, in particular, were highlighted). 
Once again, Herman demanded official government action to counter the wave of Reich 
German publications in support of German speakers in Hungary. In his reply, Tisza was 
more circumspect than before, stating that the law was equal for everybody and that the 
Hungarian government need only tell the truth in the matter. Indeed, he stressed that the 
growing scandal was a private, societal matter which should not impact on diplomatic 
relations with Imperial Germany. Tisza was clearly wary of provoking Bismarck and was 
awaiting news from Berlin. 
 Following Herman’s remarks in January there had been considerable diplomatic 
communiqués from all sides in an attempt to assess the respective positions. The German 
General Consul in Budapest, Wilhelm von Thielau, had immediately sent a report of the 
parliamentary proceedings to Berlin where Bismarck was taken aback by Tisza’s 
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reference to Posen.89 The German ambassador in Vienna, Prince Heinrich von Reuß VII, 
asked Andrássy (who, while no longer Foreign Minister, still had much influence in 
diplomatic circles) about the possible implications for the Dual Alliance. The current 
Foreign Minister Gustav Kálnoky, who was born in Moravia to a family with 
Transylvanian Székely roots, privately apologised to Reuß. Tisza’s measured reply in 
February obviously reflected the delicate state of relations between the two allies. For 
Bismarck, Hungary was an integral part of the alliance system which protected 
Germany’s vulnerable position in the heart of Europe. He was therefore pleased when the 
ADS’s actions did not find much resonance in Imperial Germany’s press. Practically, it 
was difficult to provide official help to the Transylvanian Saxons without harming the 
Dual Alliance and unduly injuring Habsburg and Hungarian pride.90 
 In the Transylvanian press, the Kronstädter Zeitung had already made its position 
clear and restricted its comments to the ironic observation that Herman in fact came from 
a German family in the Zips.91 The Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tagesblatt kept the debate 
alive by commenting on the growing publications. On 28 February it refuted both 
Nemenyi’s pro-government articles in the Hungarian-German press (referring to him as 
Abraham Neumann, presumably hinting at a German-Jewish background) and another 
brochure entitled ‘Das Deutschtum in Ungarn von einem Stock-Magyaren’.92 The 
Magyar arguments of Saxon disloyalty to the Hungarian state idea and the need for a 
modern, liberal legal framework were rejected by the Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches 
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Tagesblatt as misleading since the 1868 Nationality Law had not been respected and the 
1876 laws had broken all promises of Saxon autonomy. Heinze’s brochure, which had 
been a major reason for the current scandal, was – despite some acknowledged errors – 
defended.93 A few days later the highly respected Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung was 
invoked as commenting positively on Heinze’s pamphlet. 
 The first Correspondenzblatt des Deutschen Schulvereins zu Berlin appeared 
amidst the furore in February 1882. A full transcript of the January parliamentary debate 
occupied the first forty pages while a lecture given by Wattenbach in Dresden was 
reported, including words that echoed the sentiments of many Transylvanian Saxons 
(especially his acquaintance Karl Wolff): ‘The whole hate only stems from the Saxons – 
while at the same time being good Hungarian citizens – not preparing to sacrifice their 
Deutschtum – unlike, unfortunately, some other German-Hungarians.’94 The next issue 
also focussed on the situation in Hungary and contained an open letter, drafted by Rudolf 
Heinze, in response to the Magyar accusations. The ADS, the letter explained, only 
intended to help the Saxons in protecting their language and culture as well as their 
autonomy in churches and schools.95 There was an appeal to the Hungarian liberal 
government not to turn the Hungarian state idea into a monopoly of one race in a country 
of many nationalities. Once again, echoing comments made by Karl Wolff, the ADS 
agreed that Hungarian state feeling (ungarisches Staatsgefühl) could exist in harmony 
with the German language and people (Volkstum).96  
 At the same time, amongst Hungary’s German speaking population, a series of 
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public demonstrations were organised across the country; some in favour of the ADS’s 
offer of help and some against. Beginning with a meeting in Pancsova, a town in the 
Banat region, on 19 March (against), there were further resolutions and meeting 
throughout the summer. Towns against any ADS aid were Leutschau (2 April), Preßburg 
(4 April), Klausenburg (5 April), Pest (9 April), Csatad (10 April), Käsmark (11 April), 
Temesvar (14 April), Budapest (1 May). Towns in favour of ADS aid were concentrated 
on Saxon territory: Hermannstadt (16 April), Kronstadt (16 April), Großau (7 May), 
Mediasch (7 May), Bistritz (7 May), Broos (7 May), Heltau (14 May), Reps (18 May), 
Agnetheln (29 May), Reußmarkt (29 May), Arkeden and Meburg (30 May), Schäßburg 
(11 June) and Leschkirch (11 June).97 In its reports on the demonstrations, the 
Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tagesblatt implies that Hungarian bureaucrats and municipal 
authorities were behind the initial wave of resolutions rejecting any help from the ADS.98 
The editor, Karl Wolff, felt compelled to comment on the initial demonstrations against 
the ADS, which, he alleged, were instigated by ‘Magyars with German names’.99 He 
immediately stated that he did not agree with the Pancsova resolution since no civilised 
state would want to destroy its citizens’ sense of belonging [Stammesangehörigkeit].100 
 The Kronstädter Zeitung concentrated on the area around Kronstadt and in an 
article appearing on 13 April 1882 (three days before the Kronstadt meeting), Adolf Zay 
appealed to the voters for justice and peace which would allow the development of the 
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German language, education and civilisation within the framework of the Hungarian 
state.101 Just one day before the Kronstadt meeting, the Kronstädter Zeitung endorsed 
Zay’s article, welcoming the sentiment and describing Zay as a true advocate of German 
education and culture (Bildung und Gesittung).102 In the edition immediately after the 
local meeting, the Kronstädter Zeitung printed the resolution passed unanimously by 800 
people present.103 The resolution began by asking whether the Hungarian state would be 
built in accordance with the principles of European state building and legal development, 
or in the spirit of racial hatred. A unified, integrated Hungarian state was not wanted, the 
resolution continued, and the ADS’s actions were not inconsistent with international or 
Hungarian laws.104 A transcript of the speeches was published over the next few days but 
both in the Kronstädter Zeitung and the Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tagesblatt, comment 
on the incident subsided over the summer, partly due to the natural course of events but 
also with the realisation that the Hungarian or German governments were now involved. 
 In a summary of the meetings and of the moderate Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches 
Tagesblatt position, the brochure Die Deutschen in Ungarn und Siebenbürgen und der 
‘Deutsche Schulverein’ appeared at the end of June. After a short introduction to the 
situation and a detailed description of each meeting, including transcripts of the speeches, 
a tentative conclusion was reached. First of all, there was surprise expressed at the storm 
surrounding the ADS, since it was a private organisation helping in cultural and 
educational matters.105 Secondly, the Zipser Germans’ opposition to the ADS was 
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attributed to their different past.106 The Zipser Germans, according to the brochure, had 
no political or communal unity – not having a tradition of autonomy – whereas the 
Transylvanian Saxons could look to the Universitas as a symbol of community. The 
difference between the Saxons and the other German-speaking Hungarians (who were 
more widely scattered, less entrenched in tradition and more conducive to the Hungarian 
state idea) was made especially stark by the demonstrations. Thirdly, the Magyar press 
had focussed on the diplomatic implications, perceiving the incident as a matter for the 
German and Hungarian governments, however for the Transylvanian Saxons, and indeed 
for the German-speakers in Hungary, the real issue was deeper: did the Germans have a 
right to remain Germans in this land?107 Finally, as a result of the events, at the very least 
the Saxons had become more aware of the situation, or in the words of the author of the 
brochure: “it is the first time for a long time that the Germans there have been moved to 
speak as Germans.”108 
 The Hungarian government was most concerned, as the brochure mentioned, with 
the German government’s response and the effect on European public opinion. A change 
to the overall policy of Magyarization was not in question but the Hungarian government 
was concerned about relations with Germany and general European opinion. Tisza wrote 
to Kálnoky on 31 March 1882 about his concerns and Kálnoky replied on 3 April 1882 
promising to try and spread an official Hungarian brochure through the consulate and 
other diplomatic channels.109 Kálnoky did not regard Transylvanian Saxon political 
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activity as a serious threat to the Monarchy or its foreign policy. Indeed, in the region, he 
was more concerned with possible agitation and obstruction by the recently declared 
Kingdom of Romania and the effects on Transylvanian Romanians.110 On 9 November 
the long-awaited Hungarian government brochure in response to Heinze’s pamphlet 
appeared. Entitled Dr. Heinze’s Anklageschrift ‘Hungarica’ im Lichte der Wahrheit, the 
book was remarkably restrained in its approach. It first outlined Heinze’s criticisms of 
Magyarization and his arguments for a polyglot state, and then proceeded to refute each 
of Heinze’s points with a wealth of statistics and facts. In fact, it reads exactly as it is: a 
bureaucratic product of a governmental committee.111 Its lack of passion and dry factual 
manner was perhaps adopted in a calculated attempt to drain the emotion from the debate, 
somewhat akin to Tisza’s measured reply to Herman’s interpellation in February. Heinze 
responded in similar manner with an unemotional, factual ADS sponsored brochure.112 
 Tisza and the Hungarian government could not afford to provoke either the 
German government or public as they were already in the middle of preparing a 
Mittelschule bill which would enforce state control over education, require more Magyar 
language learning and put in place a Magyar language exam for teachers. There were also 
encouraging signs from Berlin. In general, German public opinion had not stirred greatly 
and had followed the national interest and considerations of diplomacy.113 Bismarck, 
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remained publicly silent throughout the whole affair. The debate concerning the 
Transylvanian Saxons and German-Hungarian relations now moved on to the imminent 
Mittelschule law. 
 The Mittelschule Law (1883) forms a coda to the Schulverein events. No real 
German support from the government or from the German general public for the Saxon 
cause had transpired and the Saxons remained subject to a dominant Hungarian state. 
Some Imperial German Reichstag representatives met on 15 February 1883, with the 
renowned legal professor Rudolf Gneist at their head, to protest against the Mittelschule 
law. Wattenbach gave a speech and a five-man committee drafted a strongly worded 
resolution against the law, also highlighting the centuries-old link between the 
Transylvanian Saxons and the German motherland.114 Yet the German public did not pick 
up the issue, neither during the ADS campaign nor during the passage of the Hungarian 
Mittelschule law and without governmental support the momentum behind the ADS and 
its supporters could not be maintained.115 
 Governmental circles in Berlin continued to be informed of matters in Hungary 
so, for example, Wattenbach prepared a memo for the Kaiser on the Mittelschule law.116 
Bismarck received a confidential report dated 5 March 1883 on the ADS which described 
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its members as moderate people and emphasised the ‘natural’ alliance between the 
Germans and the Magyars against the Slavs.117 This position was backed up by the 
German consul in Budapest Wilhelm von Thielau, who after a meeting with the 
Hungarian Education Minister Trefort, wrote to Bismarck stating that German and 
Magyar interests were intertwined and that a strong Austria-Hungary was needed. In his 
reply to Thielau, Bismarck’s views on the ADS, the Transylvanian Saxon position and 
the Hungarian-German relationship were made explicit. 
The Hungarian government should not lay too much political meaning on the 
remonstrations of the Schulverein nor exaggerate their weight ….. we certainly 
look with concern at the position in which the German element in Hungary is 
under pressure, but we cannot take responsibility for it, similar to the Russian 
Eastern provinces …. In Hungary, because we place a high political worth in the 
strength and unity of the Hungarian Empire that our natural desires [to help 
German speakers] must take a back seat …. Magyars and Germans in Hungary 
are mutually dependent, [but] neither of the two nationalities [is dependent] on the 
Slavs.118 
 
Bismarck described the ADS members as “opposition parliamentarians, doctrinaire 
professors and moderate people”, all of whom had no political significance.119 Thus 
despite the protest from German parliamentarians plus further action from the ADS and a 
number of demonstrations in Transylvania, the Mittelschule law entered into effect in 
1883.  
     *** 
 
The Schulverein incident along with the Mittelschule Law prompted a general change in 
Saxon political tactics, though there continued to be disagreements within the 
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community. The furore sharpened viewpoints, forced people in public life to make a 
choice and highlighted the different political options of the Saxons. In particular, it had 
demonstrated the extent to which the German government would provide support for the 
Saxons.120 Twenty years later the German Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow, a former 
diplomat including stints in St. Petersburg and Bucharest, echoed Bismarck’s words: 
For our citizens of the Reich – there we must and will defend when and where any 
injustice towards them has occurred … But for our national cousins 
(Volksgenossen), who are separated from us by international boundaries, we 
cannot intervene. That was an old principle of German policy, which had been put 
in place by Prince Bismarck, and from which no successor can depart.121 
 
In 1882, when Bismarck had made the government’s position clear, the pressure from 
German professors and parliamentarians gradually petered out. A resigned, pessimistic 
tone marked subsequent Imperial German publications about the Transylvanian 
Saxons.122  
Amongst some prominent Transylvanian Saxons leaders, the Schulverein events 
and the Mittelschule Law forced a reassessment of their political tactics. From September 
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received a number of school subventions in the early 1890s from the Romanian government in Bucharest 
until, in the interests of foreign policy friendship with Austria-Hungary, the new Romanian Prime Minister 
Dimitrie Sturdza cancelled them in October, 1895. For a number of years leading up to 1895, the 
Hungarian government had put a lot of pressure on the Romanian government to provide detailed 
information on the subventions and to halt this interference in the internal affairs of another sovereign state. 
Ultimately, Sturdza, like Bismarck, was willing to sacrifice ‘fellow nationals’ overseas in the interests of a 
pragmatic foreign policy. K. Hitchins, A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in 
Transylvania, 1860-1914 (Bucharest, 1999), pp. 307-29.  
121 From a speech in the Reichstag 19 March 1903. Quoted in Kořalka, ‘Deutschland und die 
Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918’, p. 124. In 1897 when there were Transylvanian Saxon protests against 
Hungarian legislation on place names, the German government provided no support at all. B. Suttner, ‘Die 
innere Lage Ungarns vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg in der Beurteilung deutscher Diplomaten’, Südostdeutsches 
Archiv 13 (1970), p. 125. 
122 For example, R. Bergner, Die Frage der Siebenbürger Sachsen (Weimar, 1890). The Saxon two 
children system in particular is mentioned as disadvantageous. (p. 38). See also F. Guntram Schultheiss, 
Deutschtum und Magyarisierung in Ungarn und Siebenbürgen (Munich, 1898), which came out under the 
aegis of the Alldeutscher Verband, and portrayed the Magyars as all powerful. See also the scathing view of 
Wilhelm Jager in 1897, a German diplomat in Budapest, who wrote in official dispatches that the 
Transylvanian Saxons were now a ‘degenerated race’ and ‘no longer Germans’. Quoted in Suttner, Die 
innere Lage Ungarns, p. 125. 
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1883 a dialogue was begun between the Saxons – represented by the Lutheran Bishop 
and historian Georg Daniel Teutsch and the conciliatory leader Oscar von Meltzl – and 
the Hungarian government about fairer administrative appointments and a possible 
negotiated understanding.123 In 1885 Karl Wolff .– after fighting the 1876 Law, the 1879 
and 1883 School Law, facing treason charges (1878) and actively participating in the 
1882 Schulverein debate – suddenly resigned from the prominent public post of editor at 
the Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tagesblatt to become the director of the Hermannstädter 
Allgemeine Sparkassa. In his farewell article Wolff cited personal reasons and a lack of 
energy as the primary reasons for his resignation.124 Yet his bitterness at government 
policies and the inability of the Saxons to influence decision making were also clearly 
evident: 
The State is a homestead of many peoples [Völker]; its existence depends on their 
mutual respect, support and encouragement … [But] the guarantees of freedom 
for the general citizens were sacrificed at the altar of an unfortunate nationalities 
policy adopted by the state’s decision makers….125 
 
Two years later, he would lay down his parliamentary mandate. The rest of his long life 
would be devoted to working tirelessly on improving the cultural and economic 
foundations of the Saxon community.  
After the fall of Tisza in March 1890 Wolff was one of the instigators of the 1890 
Hermannstadt Programme, the first full meeting of Saxon representatives since 1872 and 
a concerted attempt by Wolff and the ‘Blacks’ to unite Saxon representatives  and arrive 
                                                 
123 Göllner, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen, pp. 184-8. See also Egry, Ein anderer Ausgleich, pp. 51-2. 
124 Wolff, Schriften und Reden, pp. 133 and 136. The younger politician and journalist Rudolf Schuller, 
who would later also edit the SDT, described Wolff’s attitude of non-engagement with Hungarian power 
politics as a ‘form of bitter resignation’. R. Schuller, Politische Erinnerungen (Hermannstadt, 1940), p. 14. 
For his work at the Sparkassa see the Festschrift Dr. Carl Wolff als Direktor der Hermannstädter 
allgemeinen Sparkassa 1885 bis 1910. Festschrift aus Anlaß der 25. Jahreswende seiner Erwählung 
(Hermannstadt, 1910). 
125 Wolff, Schriften und Reden, pp. 135-6. 
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at an understanding with the Hungarian governing elite. He was a member of the central 
committee which prepared the draft programme and was given the task of presenting it to 
the full meeting. In his speech Wolff spoke of the difficult fight against the recent laws 
and stressed the need for an integrated programme, not just addressing parliamentary 
affairs (as the 1881 electoral programme did) but encompassing the more important areas 
of economic, agricultural, communal and cultural work.126 These areas and the 
organisations which promoted them were, he argued, the true fundaments of a Volk’s 
strength. The general goals of increased municipal autonomy, appreciation of the German 
language, respect for the law, Church and school and a possible change to the dualist 
system remained, however the focus should, Wolff argued, now be on organisational life. 
Wolff called for a Saxon conference every five years and a permanent Central Committee 
for initiatives and reform – in short, the beginnings of a modern political party. The 
programme was adopted without amendment and Wolff became the first President of the 
Central Committee.127 
 The initial signs were quite good. The Budapest government changed some key 
personnel – two Hungarian Lord Lieutenants in Transylvania, Dezső Bánffy and Gabor 
Bethlen, were replaced – in exchange for Saxon promises not to combine with other 
German speakers within Hungary.128 Moreover, in 1891 the Saxon politician Guido von 
                                                 
126 Ibid, 143. F. Gottas, ‘Vereine, Parteien und Interssenverbände der ungarländischen Deutschen’ in 
Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. Vol. 8: Politische 
Öffentlichkeit und Zivilgesellschaft. Part 1: Vereine, Parteien und Interresenverbände als Träger der 
politische Partizipation (Vienna, 2006), pp. 1205-41 presents an overview of a surprisingly under-
researched area. 
127 A copy of the 1890 Programme can be found at E. Wagner, ed., Quellen zur Geschichte der 
Siebenbürger Sachsen  (Cologne-Vienna, 1981), pp. 242-5. 
128 Kroner, ‘Introduction’ in Wolff, Schriften und Reden, p. 20. 
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Baußnern became Lord Lieutenant of Fogaras county.129 Despite these positive signs for 
the Saxons, the political climate changed almost immediately and the former Lord-
Lieutenant of Bistritz, Dezső Bánffy, became Hungarian Prime Minister in 1894, 
signalling a new intense phase of Magyarization. After the short lived unity, the Saxons 
were again divided; the Hermannstadt establishment (the ‘Blacks’) remaining true to the 
conciliatory 1890 Programme while the more radical Kronstadt grouping (the ‘Greens’) 
pushed for stronger opposition and possible political alliances with the Romanians and/or 
Banat Germans.130 Yet there were subtle differences compared to the old division 
between ‘Old Saxons’ and ‘Young Saxons’ of twenty years earlier. The ‘Blacks’ pushed 
for co-operation with the government primarily because there was no other alternative – 
the events around the Schulverein and Mittelschule law had shown this. In their opinion, 
opposition would just make matters worse. This betrayed a defeatist attitude, quite 
different from the optimistic belief in liberal co-operation among the ‘Young Saxons’ of 
the mid-1860s. The ‘Greens’, unlike the oppositional ‘Old Saxons’, did not rely on 
arguments for the old legal privileges of self-autonomy nor appeals to the Emperor. Their 
programme counselled active opposition based on ethnic rights and national struggle.  
What brought about this change in political discourse? The main driver was the 
process of Hungarian state-building and its justification of modernisation, which, as 
Friedrich Teutsch observed years after these events, was especially dangerous for the 
Saxons.131 These general European-wide trends of democratisation, industrialisation, 
mobility, individualism, standardisation and state-building all threatened the Saxons’ 
                                                 
129 Baußnern had been against the interference of the ADS in Hungarian and Saxon affairs. Baußnern, 
Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn, 193-6. Fogarasch/Făgăraş/Fogaras. 
130 Göllner, Die Siebenbürger Sachsen, pp. 190-205 and Kroner, Introduction,  pp. 21-2.  
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traditional privileged position in Transylvanian political life and their self-administered, 
relatively enclosed communities.132 In short, the transition from Stadtbürger to 
Staatsbürger was particularly problematic for the Transylvanian Saxons. The idea of state 
sovereignty, for example, was used by the Hungarian government to dismantle the Saxon 
privileges. Moreover, individual rights and equality before the law would not 
automatically benefit the Saxons, since laws were passed by a Magyar dominated 
parliament and enforcement was heavily reliant on the state bureaucracy (dominated by 
Magyars). This general modernisation process was a European-wide phenomenon, often 
associated with a nationalising drive but not always – Switzerland being an obvious 
example of decentralised, multi-lingual, culturally diverse development. This was not the 
case in Hungary. The Hungarian state, the main motor for the modernisation process, was 
firmly in the hands of the Magyar political elite and the Saxons looked to alternatives – 
the Church, private schools (mostly associated with the Church), organisational life, 
agricultural co-operatives, Saxon credit institutions and the like – for protecting their way 
of life.  
  The Saxons were not the only grouping to rely on organisational life. Thomas 
Masaryk’s Realist programme advocated ‘quiet cultural work’ and the moral 
transformation of the Czech people, while the Polish ‘organic work’ movement professed 
similar aims. Even the Austro-German liberals, who perceived themselves as the 
successors to the tradition of Josephinist state reform, had by the 1880s and 1890s turned 
to organisational life. For instance, Ernst von Plener, the principal opponent to Taaffe’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
131 See W. König, ‘Thesen zur “Bildungsrevolution” bei den Siebenbürger Sachsen’ in W. König, ed., 
Beiträge zur siebenbürgischen Schulgeschichte (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna, 1996), p. 281. 
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Iron Ring government and the acknowledged leader of the Austro-German liberals, 
described the DSV as a substitute for twelve years away from the levers of state power.133 
The Austro-German defence in Cisleithania had a different character to the Saxon 
situation since the Austro-Germans had laid claim to the traditions of the Austrian 
Gesamtstaat and felt aggrieved at their loss of position after the 1879 elections. The 
Saxons, on the other hand, accepted their minority status and never seriously challenged 
the Magyars’ leading role within Hungarian state and society. For the Saxons, the main 
focus was on autonomy and rights within the framework of a Magyar-dominated 
Hungary. The main internal political disagreements were over the nature and extent of 
autonomy and rights.  
Within Hungary other minority groups turned away from the state and developed 
their own organisational networks. For example, the Slovaks had little or no political 
representation in parliament and few possibilities of real influence at a local level. The 
vast majority of Slovaks were devout members of the Catholic Church whose institutions 
were also dominated by the Magyar elite.134 Like the Saxons, in the initial years of the 
dualist system, there was a division between Slovaks who were willing to work with the 
Hungarian government and those who advocated non-participation. Slovak resistance to 
Magyarization was concentrated around the cultural organisation Matica Slovenska 
which had a short but significant life from 1863 until 1875 whereupon the Budapest 
government closed it down for alleged Pan-Slav, anti-Magyar tendencies.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
132 This process received its classic formulation in E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchman. The Modernization 
of Rural France 1870-1914 (1977). Nothing on that scale for Central and Eastern Europe has ever been 
attempted.  
133 See M. Streitmann, ‘Der Deutsche Schulverein vor dem Hintergrund der österreichischen Innenpolitik 
1880-1918’ (Univ. of Vienna, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1984), p. 148. 
134 There was also a small but active Slovak Lutheran minority. 
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Romanians in Transylvania were in a stronger position and could use religious autonomy 
(in their case, the Orthodox and Uniate Churches) to build a political movement linked to 
cultural, educational and economic organisations.135 Romanian tactics relied on non-
involvement in the political process and direct appeals to the Emperor/King, though there 
was also a strong grouping arguing for active participation in the Hungarian 
parliament.136  
In comparison to other minority groups in Hungary, the Transylvanian Saxons 
had more economic resources, stronger traditions and institutions of local autonomy, a 
better developed independent education system, a respected language, potential support 
from the powerful German-speaking world and, proportionately, favourable political 
representation in parliament. For these reasons and the general respect for German 
culture, the Magyar elite did not expect the Saxons to assimilate as easily as other 
minorities. Coupled with Saxon recognition of a Magyar-dominated Hungary, this mutual 
regard meant there was a real possibility of common work in creating a progressive, 
prosperous, modern state – provided Saxon demands for rights and autonomy were 
respected. There was no possible Saxon irredentism (since German-speaking Austria and 
Imperial Germany were geographically very distant) and there were precedents of 
Magyars and Saxons co-operating – in the old Transylvanian Diet and even examples 
during the 1848-49 Revolutions. Indeed, the ‘Young Saxons’, in the early days of 
dualism, were willing to join a combined effort with liberal Magyar elites and there were 
nearly always at least a few Saxon parliamentarians prepared to support the government, 
                                                 
135 See the discussion in Hitchins, A Nation Affirmed, pp. 169-262. See also id., Orthodoxy and Nationality. 
Andreiu Şaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846-1873 (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), id., Rumania 
1866-1947 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 202-22 and Tanya Dunlop, ‘Astra and the Appeal of the Nation: Power and 
Autonomy in Late-Nineteenth-Century Transylvania’, Austrian History Yearbook 34 (2003), pp. 215-46. 
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no matter how harsh the law (for example, Friedrich Wächter and Carl Fabritius had 
voted for the 1876 Law while Meltzl and Jakob Rannicher had supported it). As late as 
1897 there were still four Saxon parliamentarians in the government party, including 
Guido von Baußnern. Many Saxons, through business and public affairs as well as 
personal contacts, were intimately involved with Hungarian institutions and authorities. 
Moreover, while there was little assimilation into the Hungarian community from the 
Saxon population, there was a marked increase in bilingualism. 
The Schulverein events form a minor byway in the history of German and 
Hungarian diplomacy yet in the development of Transylvanian Saxon politics it 
represented a significant turning point. The tumult of 1882-83 made clear the position of 
the Transylvanian Saxons as a minority within a Magyar dominated state, without 
meaningful support from either Vienna or Berlin, increasingly adrift in an isolated pocket 
of South-Eastern Europe. The possible involvement of Vienna and Berlin for the Saxon 
cause had foundered on the realities of political expediency and the principles of modern 
state sovereignty. Democratic thinking and demographics in general – unlike for the 
Romanian movement – were of little political value, indeed posed a threat to the Saxon 
position. The Saxon response to these processes and to the Magyar-dominated state was 
not simply an increased German national consciousness, it was varied and changed over 
time. Many Saxons (like Karl Wolff) turned inward, tried to preserve their traditional 
way of life, while co-existing with the dominant Hungarian state, and watched as events 
unfolded in Budapest, Vienna and Berlin. Others, such as Guido von Baußnern, accepted 
dualism with its assumption of Magyar dominance (though there were many different 
reasons and degrees of willingness) and gradually became integrated into official 
                                                                                                                                                 
136 Ibid, pp. 111-66. 
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institutions and Magyar speaking circles while continuing to assert their Saxon identity. 
A number of high profile activists, most prominently Edmund Steinacker who attempted 
to draw together German speakers throughout Hungary and would later use his links with 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, continued to advocate increased ethnic awareness and 
political action. Others changed their viewpoint significantly in the course of years, such 
as Karl Lurtz, the leader of the oppositional, nationalist ‘Greens’ who upon becoming a 
parliamentary representative in Budapest in 1900 joined the Hungarian government party, 
accepted official posts in Kronstadt and began socialising with the local Magyar elite.137 
These varied and changing responses reflected contrasting and individualised experiences 
to the Transylvanian Saxon dilemma and were evident in the fragmented, divisive, 
passionate nature of Saxon politics. Increased German nationalism was only one 
component of the Saxon jigsaw in the late nineteenth century. 
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137 See the description of Lurtz in K. Schnell, Aus meinem Leben. Erinnerungen aus alter und neuer Zeit 
(Kronstadt, 1934), pp. 67-9 and a brief reference in R. Schuller, Politische Erinnerungen (Hermannstadt, 
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